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THE PSYCHOLOGIST IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
Communications between physician and patient were not
privileged at common law 1 Any privilege which exists is
by grace of statute. Presently the physician-patient privilege
is allowed in thirty-five jurisdictions by statute. 2  The
general rule governing privileged communications between
attorney and client, under which the communication must
be addressed to the attorney in his professional character,
is applicable to physician and patient; the physician must
acquire his knowledge while acting in his professional
capacity, for the purpose of obtaining information on which
to base his treatment.
3
The privilege includes not only communications by the
patient to his physician, but any other information the latter
may obtain from a physical examination of the patient, by
observation, in the discharge of professional duty, or through
intervention of a third person, with a view to intelligent
treatment.
4
The first statute of this nature was passed in New York
in 1828, 5 the last in Illinois in 1959.6 No state has abolished
the privilege after once granting it.
II. APPLICATION TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
It would seem that if this privilege were to be given to
the patient in any proceeding, it should be granted to the
defendant in a criminal case, so that knowledge gained from
him could not be used to incriminate him. But this is not
the case. Less than one half of the states allow the defendant
1. 8 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 2380, at 818 (McNaughten rev. 1961)..
2. See appendix one, tnfra.
3. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227,
231 P.2d 26 (1951).
4. See, e.g., Meyers v State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E. 547 (1922) State v.
Miller, 105 Wash. 475, 178 Pac. 459 (1919).
5. N.Y. REV. STAT. 406 (pt. 3, c. 7, art. 9, § 74) (1828).
6. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 51, § 5.1 (SmithHurd Supp. 1963).
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this privilege. 7  Seven states and the District of Columbia
apply the privilege to criminal cases by statute." Illinois,
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia except homicide
cases from its operation, 9 and Kansas restricts its application
to misdemeanors. 10
Fourteen states apply the privilege to criminal cases
by decision." In North Carolina and Virginia the statutory
privilege is qualified to allow the judge to compel a disclosure
if he believes it necessary to a proper administration of
justice.12  Five states withhold the privilege from criminal
cases by decision,' 3 and five have apparently not considered
the point.' 4  West Virginia's privilege is invocable only in
Justice of the Peace courts, and thus, relatively useless.
5
In statutes where the privilege is not specifically applied
to criminal cases, or is restricted to civil proceedings, the
judicial construction becomes all important. If the language
of the statute is not limited to any particular proceeding, the
decisions uniformly allow the privilege in criminal cases. 16
In jurisdictions where the language of the statute limits the
privilege to civil proceedings, five states have held that the
privilege does not apply to criminal actions in spite of the
fact that another statute makes the rules determining the
competency of witnesses and evidence in civil actions
applicable to criminal actions except as otherwise provided.
1'7




11. Colorado, Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d 926 (1947) Indiana,
Alder v. State, 239 Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d 716 (1958) Iowa, State v. Booth, 121
Iowa 710, 97 N.W 74 (1903) Kansas, State v. Cofer, 187 Kan. 82, 353 P.2d
795 (1960) Michigan, People v. Wasker, 353 Mich. 447, 91 N.W.2d 866 (1958)
Minnesota, State v. Peterson, 123 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 1963) Mississippi, Keeton
V. State. 175 Miss. 631, 167 So. 68 (1936) Montana, Territory v. Corbett, 3
Mont. 50 (1883) Nebraska, Thrasher v. State, 92 Neb. 110, 138 N.W 120 (1912)
Nevada, State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404 (1950). cert. denied, 343
U.S. 928 (1952) New York, People v. Preston, 176 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1958) North
Dakota, State. v. Moore, 52 N.D. 633, 204 N.W 341 (1925) Ohio, State v,
Karcher, 155 Ohio St. 253, 98 N.E.2d 308 (1951) Oklahoma, Jasper v. State,
269 P.2d 375 (Okla. Cr. App. 1954) Washington, State v. Sullivan, 60 Wash.
Dec. 216, 373 P.2d 474 (1962).
12. Specifically provided for by statute, see appendix one, infra, see also State
v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846, 109 S.E. 74 (1921).
13. California, People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 39 Pac. 207, (1895) Idaho, State
v. Coburn, 82 Idaho 437, 354 P.2d 751 (1960) Oregon, State v. Betts, 384 P.2d
198 (Ore. 1963) Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Edwards, 318 Pa. 1, 178 Atli.
20 (1935) Utah, State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 254 Pac. 142 (1927).
14. Alaska, Hawaii, Missouri, New Mexico, and South Dakota.
15. W VA. CODE ANN. § 4992 (2) (1961).
16. See appendix one, snfra.
17. See appendix one, snfra and note 13, supra.
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In People v West' s the court held that this construction is
sustained by the plainest rules of construction, the common
law, and the interests of truth and justice. The internal
construction of the physician-patient section indicated that
it was the legislative intent that the privilege as to such
communications was advisedly limited to civil actions. 19
With the same statutory pattern, four states have reached
an opposite conclusion. 20 In a long analysis of the problem,
the New York court in People v Preston21 held that "Section
352 of the Civil Practice Act is made applicable to criminal
cases by section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."
The North Dakota Supreme Court held,2 2 with two dissents,
that, "It will serve no useful purpose through reasons of
expedition to consider the beneficient or harmful results of
the statute in either protecting the rights of liberty or
inhibiting proofs of crime. The statute is mandatory in its
character "23
It is a rare occasion when the issue of self-incrimination
is effectively raised, despite the fact that it would seem to
be the strongest reason for granting the privilege. The court
reasoned in State v Fouquette24 that since the relationship
of physician and patient did not exist, it was clear that the
defendant was not compelled to furnish evidence against
himself. The privilege against self-incrimination was the
point of decision in People v Wasker 25 The court said:
The troubling claim of appellant that his consti-
tutional rights were violated in permitting his personal
psychiatrist to use confidential information in the
psychiatric examinations and in testifying for the
People, is not answered satisfactorily by the prosecu-
tion's claim that it was trapped.
The real problem arises when the defendant seeks to
18. 106 Cal. 89, 39 Pac. 207, 209 (1895).
19. See State v. Bounds, 74 Idaho 136, 258 P.2d 751 (1953) for a good gen-
eral discussion.
20. Alder v. State, 239 Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d 716 State v. Booth, 121 Iowa
710, 97 N.W 74 (1903) People v. Preston, 176 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1958) State v.
Moore, 52 N.D. 633, 204 N.W 341 (1925).
21. People v. Preston, 176 N.Y.S.2d 542, 553 (1958).
22. State v. Moore, 52 N.D. 633, 204 N.W 341 (1925).
23. Id. at 342.
24. 67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404 (1950).
25. 353 Mich. 447, 91 N.W.2d 866, 867 (1958).
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invoke the privilege of his victim and thus exclude the
physician's testimony or hospital records. The great weight
of authority in jurisdictions which recognize the privilege in
criminal cases is that the defendant cannot invoke the
privilege of his victim whether the victim is dead or alive.
26
To the contention by the state that it could invoke the
privilege, the court said:
The same reasons which deny to the defendant the
right to invoke his victim's privilege, prevent the
People from invoking the complainant's privilege.
The People may not in any criminal case
withhold evidence which could conceivably disprove
or tend to disprove the defendant's guilt."
III. THE PSYCHOLOGIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The passage of fifteen statutes since 1948 which make
confidential communications between psychologist and patient
privileged gives rise to a curious anomaly 28 Statutes in
ten states place these communications on the same protected
level as those between attorney and client, 29 thus making
the communications privileged in criminal cases. The
attorney-client privilege evolved from common law and
applies in any proceeding. The language in the Utah statute
specifically applies it to criminal cases.30
Delaware, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Tennessee
have no statute granting the right of confidential commun-
ications to the physician-patient relationship, but grant an
absolute privilege to the psychologist's patient.
31
California, Idaho, and Utah refuse to apply the physician-
patient privilege to criminal cases,'32 while the psychologist-
patient statute places the privilege on the same basis as the
attorney-client relationship.3
Washington statutes make confidential communications
26. People v. Preston, 176 N.Y.S.2d 542, 554 (1958).
27. Id. at 556.
28. See appendix two, in fra.
29. Ibid.
30. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-25-9 (Replacement 1963).
31. See appendix two, infra.
32. People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 39 Pac. 207, State v. Coburn, 82 Idaho 437,
354 P.2d 751 (1960) State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 254 Pac 142 (1927).
33. See appendix two, vnfra.
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made to both physician and psychologist privileged in
criminal cases.
3 4
In the remainder of the states, the applicability of the
statute making confidential communications between psy-
chologist and patient privileged would appear to be contingent
upon the construction given that state's physician-patient
privilege statute. Colorado, Michigan and Montana have
granted the physician's patient this privilege, by judicial
decision, in criminal cases.3 5  Oregon withholds it, 30 and
New Mexico and Arkansas have apparently not passed on the
subject.
The psychiatrist is necessarily a physician and generally
does not have the required type of education to qualify for
registration under the state's psychologist registration act.37
Thus the privileged communications section is inapplicable
to his professional relationships. As a result of the statutory
and judicial pattern, California, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky,
New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Utah would make commun-
ications from the patient to his psychologist privileged but
would not grant the same privilege to the patient-psychiatrist
relationship.
This extention seems strange as the physician-patient
privilege is the one which has been under general attack
for many years by courts, legislatures, and writers; 3 yet
the psychologist-patient privilege statutes have all appeared
since 1948, the greatest number in any one year having been
passed in 1963.39  Connectcut 40 and Georgia 41 have passed
psychiatrist-patient privileged communication statutes with-
out having a physician-patient privileged communication
statute. In jurisdictions whose statutes grant the privilege
to physician's patients without qualifying the word, there is
little doubt that psychiatrist's patients are included within
the scope of the statute.
42
34. See appendices one and two, snlra.
35. Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d 926 (1947) People v. Wasker,
353 Mich. 447, 91 N.W.2d 866 (1958).
36. State v. Betts, 384 P.2d 198 (Ore. 1963).
37. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PRoF. § 2941 (West 1962), which requires a doctor-
ate degree in psychology or the equivalent thereof for certification.
38. See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380, at 829-30 (McNaughton rev 1961).
39. See appendix two, infra.
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146 (a) (1961).
41. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418 (5) (Supp. 1963).
42. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, supra note 3.
1964]
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IV RATIONALE OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST PRIVILEGE
It would appear from the legislation that there is a great
deal of disagreement among legislatures as to the real
difference between the physician and psychologist. It
certainly cannot be on the basis of the Hippocratic Oath,
All that may come to my knowledge in
the exercise of my profession or outside of my pro-
fession or in daily commerce with men, which ought
not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will
never reveal. 45
for the psychologist is not bound to it as the psychiatrist is.
But there certainly is a rational basis for extending to
the psychologist's patient a privilege not extended to the
physician's patient. The psychologist has a unique need to
preserve the confidence of his patient both in and out of
court. Patients are likely to be more ashamed of mental
ill-health than of physical impairment or injury There is
much more reason to assume that one consulting a psycholo-
gist intends confidence more than the ordinary accident
plaintiff.
44
What is more, the patient's statements may re-
veal to his therapist much more than the patient
intends or realizes. The psychiatric patient confides
more utterly than anyone else in the world. He ex-
poses to the therapist not only what his words directly
express, he lays bare his entire self, his dreams,
his fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most patients
who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what
will be expected of them, and that they cannot get
help except on that condition. It would be
too much to expect them to do so if they knew that
all that they say - and all that the psychiatrist
learns from what they may say - may be revealed
to the whole world from a witness stand.
45
Confidentiality becomes difficult in the case of the self-
referred criminal, especially in instances where the individu-
43. STEDMAN, MEDICAL DICTIONARY, at 708-09 (1961) (Physician's oath).
44. GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 271 (1952).
45. Id. at 272, (Quoted in part with approval by Taylor v. U.S., 222 F.2d
398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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al's crime has not yet been discovered. Since crime itself
makes up the illness for which treatment is sought, anything
connected therewith is privileged.4
6
In People v Hawthorne47 the court stated, "I do not
think it can be said that his (the psychologist's) ability to
detect insanity is inferior to that of a medical man whose
experience along such lines is not so intensive."
48
If the law of a state recognizes that psychologists perform
a useful and legitimate function by legalizing their practice,
and requiring their registration, it would appear that a
privilege for the psychologist-patient relationship should be
granted on the basis of the statutory acceptance of the
psychologist.
The psychiatrist has even gone so far as to risk contempt
of court to protect this relationship. Prior to the enactment
of the statute in Illinois, a psychiatrist, when called to the
stand, refused to divulge confidences that one party had
communicated to him as a patient. The trial court ruled
that a psychiatrist is not required to testify to such confidential
communications, even though there was no Illinois statute
conferring such a privilege. The Illinois court has recognized
that there is a distinction between mental and physical illness
and the man who receives treatment for mental illness ought
to have the privilege of confidential communications. The
court said that the relationship between the psychiatrist and
his patient "is unique and is not at all similar to the relation-
ship between physician and patient. ' 4 9 Similarly, it would
seem that this uniqueness is true of the psychologist.
V THE WIGMORE TEST
What is the result of the application of Wigmore's famous
tests"0 for legitimate privilege as applied to physicians and
psychologists? First, that "The communications must origi-
nate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed." 51 In
46. Eaton, Treatment for the Criminal, in CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY 220 (1962).
47. 293 Mich. 15, 291 N.W 205 (1950).
48. Id. at 208 (Separate opinion).
49. Guttrnacher, op. cit., supra note 44, at page 269-70.
50. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See ap-
plicable tests at 527.
51. Ibid.
1964]
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his evaluation of the physician-patient privilege, Wigmore
says that of the thousands of cases occurring, very few of
the communications are confidential in any real sense.
52
Communications to a psychologist during the course of
treatment are of a confidential nature. The very essence
of psychotherapy is confidential personal revelations about
matters which the patient is and should normally be reluctant
to discuss. The inviolability of that confidence is vital to the
achievement of the purposes of the relationship. A confession
obtained by improper influence exerted by a psychiatrist
working for the prosecution has been held inadmissible in
evidence by a New York Court, which said: "This interview
was a subtle intrusion upon the rights of defendant and was
tantamount to a form of mental coercion, which, despite the
good faith of the prosecution, we may not countenance here. ' ' 8
The second of these tests is that: "This element of
confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties." 54 As to
this test the author comments that even though the disclosure
to the physician might be confidential, it would likely be
made regardless of any privilege existing. People will not
refrain from seeking medical aid solely because of the
possibility of its being disclosed. 55
The inviolability of the confidence is essential to the
achievement of the relationship between psychologist and
patient. Almost all information elicited from the patient in
psychotherapy is necessary for treatment. "Many physical
ailments might be treated with some degree of effectiveness
by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist
must have his patient's confidence or he cannot help him." 56
It should be noted that the avoidance of litigation is often the
reason a person submits himself to psychotherapy He seeks
aid in an attempt to control unconventional activity
The third test is that: "The relation must be one which
in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
52. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380, at 829 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
53. People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553, at 558 (1961).
54. Supra note 50.
55. Supra note 52.
56. Taylor v. U.S., 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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fostered. ' ' 57 As to this, Wigmore says, "That the relation
of physician and patient should be fostered, no one will
deny "58
The psychologist-patient relationship is one that should
be fostered. Psychology today has gained a position of
popularity, respect, and status. This is illustrated by the
fact that psychiatric departments have been established to
aid the courts and prison officials.
The fourth requires that: "The injury that would inure
to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must
be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation. ' ' 59 Wigmore emphatically denies that
as compared to the other privileges, injury to the patient can
never be so great in a physician-patient relationship.' 0
The information gained from a patient by a psychologist,
if revealed, would produce an injury of far greater
consequence to the relationship of that patient and his
psychologist and to the whole area of psychotherapy than it
would any ultimate benefit to justice. The material dealt
with in psychotherapy is not strictly of the world of reality,
but often is made up of fantasies, which are not pertinent to
the inquiry of the court. By and large, the data is of no
value in the realism with which the court must deal, and
should be excluded as irrelevant.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that granting a privilege to the patient of
the psychologist, an absolute necessity for that relationship,
demands uniform legislation which is not contingent upon
any physician-patient privilege or its construction or appli-
cation. Those states which have adopted it as a part of their
psychologist registration acts and given it the same status
as the attorney-client privilege, have saved both the courts
and the patients a great deal of grief.
Wigmore, in reference to use of the physician-patient
57. Supra note 50.
58. Supra note 52, at 830.
59. Supra note 50.
60. Supra note 52, at 830.
NOTES1964]
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privilege by the plaintiff in a civil action, says, "In all of
these the medical testimony is absolutely needed for the
purpose of learning the'wtruth. In none of them is there any
reason for the party to conceal the facts, except as a tactical
maneuver in litigation.
' ' 6 1
61. Id. at 831.
Appendix One: 2 BID
Physician-Patient Statute
I. Alaska Rules of Court Procedure
Rule 45 (h) (4) (1962)
2. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1802 (5) (1956) X
3. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-607 (1947)
4. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1881 (West 1955) x
5. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-1-7 (4) 1953) x
6. HALWAII REV. LAWS TrT. 25 § 9840 (1945)*
7. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203 (4) (1947) X
8. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 51 § 5.1
( ithHurd Supp. 1953) x (h)
9. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (4) (Burns 1946) x10. IOWA CODE ANN, § 622.10 (1950) X
11. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427
(S.B. 140 1963) x (i)
12. LA. RED. STAT. § 15-476 (1950) X
13. MICH. Comp. LAWS § 617.62 (1948) x x
14. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 592.02 (1947) X X
15. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1697 (1957) x x
16. Mo. RED. STAT. § 491.060 (1959) x x
17. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-701-4 (4)
(1963) x X
18. NED. REV. STAT. § 25-1206 (1943) x X
19. NED. REV. STAT. § 48-080 (1957) x x
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1012 (d) (1953) x
21. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4504 (a) x x
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1951) x x(d)
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06 (1960) x X
24. OHIO RED. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (A)
(Baldwin 1958) x
25. OKLA. STAT. TIT. 12, § 385 (6) (1961Y X
26. ORE. REV. STAT. § 44-040 (d)
(1963 Replacement) x x
27. PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 28, § 328
(Purdon 1958) X x
28. S.D. CODE § 36-0'101 (3) (1939)
29. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (4) (1953) X X
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-289.1 (1957 Replacement) x(d)
31. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 52-020
(1961) X
32. W VA. CODE ANN. 4992 (e) (1961) (J)
33. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 325.21 (1958) x(h)
34. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-139 (1) (1957) x
S5. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-308 (1961) x(h)
*possible later amendments unavailable.
(h) homicide exception.
(mn) restricted to misdemeanors.(d) at the discretion of the court.
(J) Justice of the peace courts only.
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This criticism is not available when the subject is the
defendant in a criminal case. The use of such confidential
communications as the patient may make to a psychiatrist is
an intrusion upon the defendant's rights, and, is little better
than coercion when by an unwilling defendant. 62 However
valid the criticism of the physician-patient privilege may be,
it is unrealistic when applied to the communications of a
defendant to his psychologist in a criminal case.
GLENN DILL
62. People v. Leyra, supra note 53. Though
a psychiatrist, it is obvious that the same dec
chologist involved.
Appendix Two
the court was concerned with
ision would obtain were a psy-
O. W
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1. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1516 (1957) x x x x 1955
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 2904 (West 1962) x x x 1957
3. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-1-70
(Supp. 1961) x x x 1961
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3534
(Supp. 1962) x x 1962
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3118 (1955) x x 1951
6. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2314
(Supp. 1963) x x x 1963
7. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1018 x x 1948
8. MIcH. COMP. LAws § 38-10-18
(Mason Supp. 1961) x x x 1959
9. MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 93-701-4"
(1963) (Children only) x x x
10. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. C. 330-A, § 19
(Supp. 1963) x x 1957
11. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-30-17
(Supp. 1963) X x 1963
12. N.Y. EDUC. § 7611 x x X x 1956
13. ORE. REv. STAT. § 44-040* x 1963
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1117 (1956) x x 1953
15. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-25-9 (1963) x x x 1959
16. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. TIT. 18, § 83-110
(1963) x x x x 1955
*part of general privileged communications statute.
